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Institute of Mental Health is gratefully acknâwledged.The past few years have witnessed an outpouring of research directed
toward discovering the relationship between human wealth and human capital.
Manyofthe papers have been theoretical [e.g., Becker (1964), Ben—Porath
(1967), Rosen (1973), Haley (1973)] while others, more data—oriented pieces,
have sought empirical description of the relationship [see, among others,
Hanoch (1967), Griliches and Mason (1972), T. Johnson (1970), Mincer (1974)
and Welch (1973)]. The theoretical underpinnings for much of what has
transpired are derived from Schultz (1962), Becker (1967) and Mincer (1970).
Controversial from the start, most of the criticism has consisted ofques-
tioning the relevance of the analysis rather than the theoretical validity
of it. Two notable exceptions are Becker (1967) and Rosen (1973). In
this paper, a few theoretical issues will be raised regarding the relation-
ship between the distribution of human capital and that of human wealth.
Special attention will be paid to the empirical implications of the analysis.
I.Inequality of Income v. Inequality of Wealth
This section will make the following rather simple point: There is no
simple combination of discounted flows of wage and property incomes that
reflects an individual's true wealth position. Even in the absence ofprop-
erty income, the present value of the stream of earnings is likely to over-
state an individual's wealth and overstate it to a larger extent for wealthy
individuals.12
Tosee this, consider a two—period world in which individual A is
endowed with B0 (inheritance) of physical capital in period zero, L0
of raw labor in period zero and L1 in period one the rental price of which
is R per unit. All individuals are not alike except to the extent that
there are securities that all can purchase yielding rate r. Suppose that
A also has the option of investing some kB0 in a machine which will return
(1 + r*)kB0 in period one. In addition, he may use some given proportion
h of raw labor which, when combined with cB0 of physical capital (c + k <1),
produces human capital sold in period one for (l+r)(hRL0 + cB0) dollars.
The individual has four possibilities:
(1) No investment
a. Consume B0 + RI0 in period zero and RL0 in period one (L1L0).
b. Consume n(B0 + Io) in period zero and purchase (or sell)
(l—n)(B0 + RI.0) of securities to consume (l—n)(B0 + RI.0) (l+r) + RL0
in period one.
(2) Invest in the machine, but not in human capital. Then consumption
in period zero is n[(l—k)B0 + R10) while that in period one is
(l+r*)kB0 + RL0 + (l-n)[(l—k)B0 + RL0](l+r).
(3) Invest in human capital, but not in the machine. Then consumption.
in period zero is n[(l—h)RL0 + (l—c)B03 while that in period one
is (l+r)(hRL0 + cB0) + (l+r)(l—n)[(l—h)RL0 + (l—c)B0].
(4) Invest in both human capital and the machine. Then consumption
in period zero Is n[(l—h)RL0 + (l—k—c)B0) while that in period one is
(l+r')(hRL0+cB0)+(l+r*)kB0 + (l+r) (l—n)[(l—h)RL0 + (j.—k—c)B0] + RI.0.3
Wealth levels in (l)a. and (l)b. are necessarily identical when future
consumption is discounted at rate r. If r*>r then (2) dominates (1). The
difference between (2) and (l)b. is that consumption in period zero is nkB0
smaller for (2) and consumption in period one is kB0(1+r)(l—n) —(l+r*)kB0
larger for (2). The present value of the difference between (2) and (1)b.
is then —kB0 + kB0. If r*>r then (2) yields higher wealth than (1)b.
and thereby dominates it. But the difference between wealth levels is over-
stated by r*kB0 since the opportunity cost of funds is rkB0. I.e., rkB0 is
the normal flow return on previous income and only (r*-.r)kB0 is profit which
should be counted when looking at wealth differences across individuals. The
point is especially relevant in the context of wage v. property income. An
indiVidual who earns $100 in wages in each period and who purchases a $50
security during period zero will have a larger observed income flow in per-
iod one than the same individual who consumed the entire $100 in period zero.
Yet both clearly have the same wealth. The "profit" on the purchase of
security is zero since r*=r. Although observed income is higher in period
one when the security is purchased, the cost is reduced consumption in per-
iod zero, the market value of which is identical to the period one return.
If, on the other hand, the $50 were invested in an asset that yielded, on
average, r*>r, 50(r*_r) is "profit" and should be counted as actual income
in period one.2
Treatment of investment in human capital is perfectly analogous. The
only important difference is that a major part of investment costs here take
the form of foregone earnings. Since wage income in period zero is hRL low-
er as the result of the investment in human capital, (hRL0)(l+r) of income4
in period one should be counted as actual income in the wealth calculation.
To this again, should be added the inframargin.al return to the investment,
(r—r)(RL0 + cB0). Another way to say this is that wage wealth is the pres-
ent value of the permanent income flow RL0 plus profits from investment in
human capital.
Thus, there is no simple way to add property income to wage income to
obtain a measure of true income. Part of the property income simply reflects
thenormal return on previously earned (and counted)wages and property income.
return above "normal" return can be computed once r is known to obtain an
accurate measure of wealth. Similarly, current wage income includes the re-
turnto previous investment in human capital, part of which is "normal"
and part of which (r'— r), is inframarginal and super—normal. It is only
the latter component that should be included in the computation of actual
income. Thus, the discounted flow of observed earnings overstates true
wage wealth by
rD0 r(D0+ D1) r(D0-4- D1+ D2) r(D0+ D1+.. .+DT1 + + +. . . +
(l+r) (l+r)2 (l+r)3 (l+r)T
where D is the amount of direct outlay for human capitalacquisition in
periodt.Sincehigher wealth individuals tend to invest in more human capital,
D tends to be larger for high wealth individualsand the overstatement there-
fore larger.
II. HumanCapital and Wealth—Augmentation
Can theacquisition of human capital augment an individual's wealth? In
a trivial sense, the answer is no. The situation is analogous to a firm that
is granted a government—enforces monopoly. The entire value of themonopoly5
profits can be capitalized and attributed as rent to the franchise right.
A similar treatment of human capital profits can be made. Birth ises-
sentially the grantingof a franchise which allows a maximum—wealth level
when optimal (profit—maximizing) Investment behavior is followed. Wealth
can be destroyed if the individual does not act to maximize it; but in a
trivial sense it can never be created by human capital.3
Yet this point is a semantic one. A more substantive one still under-
lies most of the empirical work on human capital. Becker (1967) and more
recently Rosen (1973), have pointed out that the "rate of return" as obtained
from cross—sectional analyses tells nothing about the marginal return to
additional acquisition of human capital (usually schooling). Rosen is more
specific. He argues that the Mincer (1970) semi—log human capital function
is inconsistent with optimization on the part of the individual. The point
that Rosen makes relates to the assumption in Becker (1964) of a constant
average rate of return over the life cycle. Rosen suggests that if this
ratewere constant, one would observe bang—bang dynamics in the hu-
man capital accumulation process. The analysis has Implications for the
relationship between wealth andhuman capital across individuals. Itis
alsobest discussed in the terms of Mincer's (1970) derivation of the hu-
man capital function, which although equivalent to the earlier Becker (1964)
specifications, lends itself more readily to analysis of wealth.
Mincer's procedure begins by defining an individual's labor wealth as
(1) Rs
=1NWSedt
Where S is the highest level of schooling completed, r is the discountrate,6
N is the retirement age and W is the (per period) market wage of an indi-
vidual with S years of schooling. (Define period zero to be the year that
schoolattendance begins and assume that the total cost of attending school
consists of foregoing allwagesduring the period of attendance.) Wealth
must be equalized across individuals, it is argued, or individuals would
alter their school attendance until the market adjusted wages in such a
way as to equalize wealth. Thus, an individual who acquired no schooling
would have wealth:
N -rt
(2) R0 o W0e dt
Since R0 mustequalR5,






Note that up to this point, nothing has been said about rates of re-
turn.So far r is simply the discount rate. This becomes a rate of return
only when it is added that if the marginal rate of return were to exceed
r, individuals would continue to invest andwouldnecessarily acquire ad—
ditional schooling until the marginal rate of return were equal to r.47
Thusthe inference that r is a rate of return requires that equation (5)
be an equilibrium condition.5 The model, by construction, assumes that
individuals specialize either in work or in investment in human capital
so that the observed wage is the actual wage which equals the workers's
VMP. (When itisacknowledged thatsomecompensation takes the form of
on—the—jobtraining, the observed wage is no longer the appropriate unit
of analysis. This is the case for the reason that the observedpayment
understates true payment and that the true wage rate increases over the
lifetime so that W represents a weighted average of discountedwages.)
Theassumption that Rs equals R0 for all individuals was defended by
claiming that the result is the natural outcome of competition between
workers. This implies one of the twothings.On the one hand, we may
assumethat allworkers are alike. If so,the only situation under which
onewould observe different levels of schooling attainment by different
individuals is one where the marginal rate of return was equal to the
discount rate at all levels of schooling. This implies that themarginal
rate of return is equal to the average rate of return so that investment
in human capital does not alter an individual's wealth. If thiswere not
the case, all individuals would choose the same amount ofschooling.
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If the rate of return function were of the shape illustrated in Fig. 1,
all individuals would invest in S of schooling, the marginal rate of
return would equal r0 and would lie below the average rate of return,
Only when the rate of return function is like p*(S) in Fig. 2 are indi-
viduals indifferent between different levels of schooling. Here, the
marginal, rate of return equals the average rate of return which equals
r0. (If p*(S) were horizontal above r0, an infinite amount of schooling
would be acquired driving down the rate of return to schooling until It
equaled r0. If p*(S) were horizontal below r0, no schooling would be
acquired..)6 Investment in human capital under these circumstances is simply a
way to finance different consumption time preferences. Individuals who
preferred to consume more later (say, because their family size was ex-
pected to increase) could invest in human capital as a form of savings
which returns present income compounded at the market rate of interest
at some date in the future. However, the individual could just as easily
work now at the wage W0 and put his current income in the bank. Starting
in period S he would then be able to withdraw an amount equal to the dif-
ference between and W0 until the period N so that his received "income"
would equal W5. Thus, under the assumption of equality across individuals,
investment in human capital is identical to saving. There is no need to
analyze it any differently than one would analyze the purchase of a security.
"Investment in human capital is not investment in any wealth increasing
sense, but rather a way to save. The r that is estimated in (5) is not
only the rate at which one borrows and lends in the securities market, but9
is also the internal borrowing and lending rate. If the assumption of
worker equality is maintained, humancapita].becomes impotent in the usual
sense. It has no effect on wealth and merely offers another way to express
timepreference.There are no infrmarginal profits to be taken by invest-
ing in humancapital.
Onthe other hand, one could explain different levels of schooling
acquisition by arguing that individuals have different abilities. Onecan
imagineasituation in which some workers are more adept at manual labor
jobs requiring no schooling while others have a comparative advantage in
the performanceoftasks which require schooling. Both groups might have
equal wealth, but this does not imply that investment in humancapital
does not produce wealth. Since individuals in both groups maximize their
wealth levels, by investingin fewer yearsof schooling, the academic group
wouldsuffer a wealth decrease. Similarly, aninvestment in additional
schooling by a blue—collar individual results in a wealth decrease on his
part. In this situation, investment inhuman capitalyields inframarginal
rents.Although the individual earns only the normal return r for a final
unit of human capital, he capturesr>r for previous units and thereby pro-
duces wealth through his investment. Implicit here is the fact that the
unschooled wage rate obtainable by the academic population is less than
the unschooled wage rate of the manual laborgroup.Similarly, W for the
school—orientedindividuals exceeds the potential Wforblue—collar work-
ers.It is clear, however, that VS earned by the academics exceeds W0
earned by the laborers since the former spend less time in the labor force
and both groups by assumption have the samewealth.An obvious implication10
of this kind of reasoning is that by requiring that an individual attend
more school than he would otherwise choose, his wealth necessarily de-
creases.(Nor can one argue that even though his wealth decreases, his
child's increases through externalities which cause the child to move from
the blue—collar to academic group. Even ifthiswere accomplished, nothing
isgained since, by assumption, both groups have equal wealth.)
At this point, however, it is necessary to consider the original as—
suinption. Wealth was equalized across individuals by competition in the
labor and occupation market. The above reasoning, however, was based on
the notion of inequality between individuals, i.e., of non—competing groups.
But if that is the case, there is no reason to assume that wealth levels
are equal across the two groups. Once one allows wealth to differ between
groups, the Mincer derivation of the semi—log wage function disintegrates.
Let us summarize the discussion to this point: One is able to derive
the semi—log wage function by assuming that wealth is equalized across indi-
viduals. One observes,however, that different individualsacquire differ-
ing amounts of schooling over their lifetimes. If all individuals have
equal ability and cpportunity, differences in schooling simply reflect
different consumption time preferences. No wealth is produced by school
attendance and "investment" in human capital is not investment at all, but
rather a way to save. If, on the other hand, individuals are not equal in
ability, schooling levels may differ. However, then the justification for
the assumption of equal wealth across individuals breaks down and so, then,
does the derivation of the semi—log wage function. Nor is the point specific
to the semi—log wage function. If cross—sectional analysis is appropriate,11
it must be the case that individuals have the same opportunities or it is
inappropriate to compare two values of a particular variable. If indi-
viduals differ in values of that variable, either they face differentop-
portunities, in which case they are non—competing groups, or they are
indifferent between the two values, in which case wealth cannot differ by
values of that variable. In the former case, as Rosen points out, the
estimates of rate of return (or any schooling coefficient) is a not very
informative average across different individuals with different opportuni-
ties. In the latter case, it simply is an estimate of the discount rate.
An alternative rationale:
Longitudinal data sets (as the National Longitudinal Survey and Michi-
gan—Income Dynamics Study) allow an alternative derivation of the semi—log
wage function. Let us start with the fact that observed wages grow over
an individual's lifetime. Approximate this growth by a general form of
growth equation of the form
(6) W =AWeE1(t .))(t—t)
where t is age at the beginning of the period and T is age at the end.
A is a shift parameter which relates to the chronological period and is
therefore invariant across individuals. The fact that the growth rate
itself, Y, is a function of life—cycle time means that long—term wage
growth may assume any shape and is not restricted to exponential growth.
When an individual acquires additional human capital through schooling his
marginal product rises. This tends to cause wages to grow. It is then12
reasonable to postulate that in its simplest form
(7) I =0+ cli(t) + cI2(S— St)
where S is the level of schooling in periodT and St is the level of
schooling in period t. cx1(t) represents the effect of age itself on wage
growth, i.e., it is the term responsible for-shifting the wage growth func-
tion over the lifetime (see Lazear (1975), for a more complete discussion
of the rationale). Upon substitution and after taking the log of both sides
of (6), one obtains
(8) in =inA + in + cij + a1(t) + a2(S _S),
which is essentially the same equation as the Mincer semi—log wage function.
If the discrete investment construct of the Mincer model is maintained,
a2 must exceed r in order for individuals to be indifferent between invest-











rt N rt —rt The present value of the stream W0e= (W0e )edt =NW0necessarily
exceeds the present value of the stream
(9) W(t) =fTWoe rtd + N WSertdt
There exists, however, a discount rate r' < r such that
(10) T WOetdt+1NWSe_rtdt1N (WOert)etdt
since the right hand side equals the constant NW0 and the left hand side,
which is less than NW0 for r' =ris equal to tW0 + (N_T)W > NW0 for r'=O.
Continuity of the left—hand side guarantees that for some r', (10) holds with
equality. Thus if 2 =rso that wage growth between 0 and T equals r, the
discount rate must not exceed r' < cz in order for the individual to under-
take the investment.
The interpretation of a2 is important and differs from the usualone of
a marginal rate of return. The a2 coefficient is an average rate of growth
which must exceed the marginal rate of return. This interpretation, unfor-
tunately, says less than did the marginal rate of return concept. The latter
tells us the value of an additional year of investment in schooling; the
former does not. The average growth rate tells us about inframarginalre-
turns as well as marginal ones. Unless we are willing to specify a rate of
returns function which gives us the relationship between the marginal and
average rates (essentially the approach employed by Rosen (1973) and by
Brown (1974)), one cannot infer the value of an additionalyear of schooling
from the estimates.
The tale is not quite as grim as it at firstappears. Equation (8) al-
lows us to mitigate the effects of this problem byestimating the coefficients14
in a growth context rather than by considering wage levels. Rewrite (8) as
(11) in W —inVt =inA + + cz1(t) + cx2(S— S)
As t —tbecomes small, the difference between the marginal and average rates
of growth shrink. Thus, by using longitudinal data across individuals one
may obtain estimates which are fairly close approximations for the marginal
effect of schooling on wages.
There is still the difficulty, however, that if the individual is cur-
rently investing in on—the—job training, the observed wage does not reflect
the true wage. However, as long as the proportion of compensation received
in money wages does not change greatly between t and T, the growth form of
wage function which considers only observed wage differences will eliminate
most of this bias.
In the same way that lumping years of schooling and wage growth together
reduces the information content of the model, combining school attendance










It is much more accurate to say that the average growth rate between 0 and
Tisy and between tandT'iszero than to say that the average growth rate
between 0 and T'isy', which tends to understate the effects of schooling.
There is an additional justification for using the longitudinal wage
growth specification. If "ability" affects wage rates, it enters the wage
level function as an omitted variable. However, as long as the effect of
ability on wages is invariant over time (chronological and life—cycle),
looking at wage growth differences out the ability affect so that the esti-
mates do not suffer from omitted variable bias.7 Finally, as shown in the
appendix, the wage growth specification is not theoretically inconsistent
with optimization although it may be empirically. I.e., the actual estimates
may violate stability conditions.
The important difference between the Becker—Mincer derivation and wage
growth derivation of the semi—log wage function is that the latter permits
wealth to be augmented by investment in human capital. In addition, it al-
lows for externalities that result in the increased wealth of other persons
—theindividual's children for example.8 If this were the case, children
would be willing to compensate parents for obtaining additional units of edu-
cation. If it were difficult to arrange the intergenerational transfer, par-
ents would underinvest in their own schooling, thereby providing justifica-
tion for government subsidization of education.916
Sunsnary and Conclusion
This paper considers tworelatedtheoretical issues concerning the re-
lationshipbetween wealth and human capital. The first part of the paper
is devoted to a discussion of measures of wealth inequality. It is argued
that there is no simple way to add discounted property income flows to dis-
counted wage flows to obtain a measure of wealth because a part of the form-
er niay simply reflect the normal returns on the latter. In fact, even if
property income were zero throughout, the discounted stream of earnings would
tend to overstate the individual's wealth since part of the earnings are the
normal return to direct outlays made in order to produce the earnings stream.
The second part of the paper discusses the role of human capital in
wealth—augmentation. It is argued that traditional human capital theories
either imply that human capital is a non—wealth increasing security, simply
yielding the market rate of interest, or that the derivation of the usual
empirical specification is inconsistent. The former is true if all indivi-
duals have the same ability and opportunities; the latter is true when a—
bjlities differ so that individuals become members of non—competing groups.
Finally, an alternative rationale for the semi—log wage function is
offered. This specification is appropriate only when the analysis is con-
ducted with longitudinal data so that the estimates result from observing
the same individual during different points in the life—cycle.17
FOOTNOTES
relatedpoint is made by Smith (1975). There it is argued that
as the result of optimal life—cycle savings, current assets cannot be used
as a proxy for wealth in labor supply functions.
2Note that r* >rshould not merely reflect a risk premium so that
•the corrected riskiess market rate of return is equal to r. Instead, it
must reflect a true return to disequilibrium; it is inframarginal return
that individual A can capture, but that others cannot. This ca be the
result of specialized information or differential ability. The "prof it" on
the investment is simply a rent to these specialized factors. See Friedman
(1955) and Levhar.i and Weiss (1974) for related discussion of this point.
3See Pesek and Saving (1967) for a related discussion withrespect
to creation of wealth by the monetary system.
4Assume that age—earnings profiles cross only onceso that the rate
of return is well—defined. See J. Hirschliefer (1970), pp. 51—57, for a
complete discussion of the validity of the rate of return rule.
5Equilibriumalso requires that the wage rate W be a "permanent"
wage.
6 implicit assumption is that S is theappropriate unit of analysis.
Inthismodel and in those generally used empirically, no variationinthe
rateof schooling acquisition is permitted. Thus, the condition that an
individual acquires either one or zero units of schooling per year (or cor-
responding fractions) is imposed.
It should also be mentioned that the curves drawn in Figs. 1 and
2 do not exhaust the entire possibility of functional shapes. Consider a18
negatively sloped marginal rate of return function and an inverted U—shaped
average return function. If the peak of the inverted U were at Sr, invest—
inent in S* would have no effect on wealth and all individuals would have
the same level of schooling. What we seek to explain here, however is how
one might observe levels of schooling differing across individuals.
71f ability affects wage growth per Se, i.e., is part of y, ob-
viously nothing is gained by the wage growth formulation.
was argued that under the non—wealth increasing formulation,
there couldbeno spill over effects of education on other individuals be-
cause their wealth levels were alway8 equalized.
0
Thisquestion is considered in greater detail in Lazear (1975a).19
APPENDIX
Inthis section the conditions, under which the wage growth specifica-















Ifthemarginal cost of anadditionalyear of schooling consists onlyof






(A7) fe0+ a1t + a2S)=.22.e —e__t)]20
Taking logs and rearranging terms yields
(A8) AS =— [—ina2 —in(e —e_r_t))+ ln r —(inA + a0) —a1t]
Threeconditions must be met by (A8) in order for (Al) to be consistent.
First, as the result of the discussion on page 12, a2 must exceed r. Second,
must be non—negative. Finally, must become negative eventually,
i.e., school attendance reaches zero at death.
Nothing in (A8) violates the first requirement. Whether or not a2 ex-
ceeds r is an empirical matter. In previous work, with longitudinal data,
(Lazear (l975a)), I estimated a2 to be .1467 for men14—24years old in
(.0363)
1966. This estimate is unlikely to violate the conditionthat a2 >r.
The second condition, that S be non—negative depends upon the sign of
the term bracketed in (A8). Again, using estimates from Lazear (l975a), one
obtains ASt <0for the mean individual in the sample used (National Longi-
tudinal Survey —YoungMen, 1966—69) if r =.10.This casts doubt on the ac-
ceptability of the wage growth formulation as a justification for the semi—
log wage function.
Finally, upon differentiating (A8) with respect to t we obtain
AS —r(N—t)
(A9 tir—re —a —t
—r —r(N—t)
1 3t e —e
The first term is clearly negative. cz1, however, is also negative (wage
growth slows down over the life cycle) butispositive (the difference
between being 16 and 17 years old is more significant for wage growth than
is the difference between being 40 and 41). Thus, the sign of atis inde—
terminate at any point. However, as t increases, al becomes increasingly
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